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BANK CRISIS IN ARGENTINA: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANK DEPOSITS
PESIFICATION, THE MASSA CASE
Ignacio Hirigoyen*
I. INTRODUCTION
RGENTINA experienced its biggest bank crisis in history from
2000 to 2002. The financial crisis was so severe that it is re-
garded as one of the most severe to ever occur during a peace-
time period. At one point during such economic turmoil, Argentina went
through five presidents in eight days. The fifth President, Eduardo
Duhalde,1 declared a state of economic emergency 2 and made executive
decisions, taking economic measures that were the source of much con-
troversy and litigation. This paper will address the Massa case,3 which
arose out of a challenge to the constitutionality of such executive deci-
sions and went all the way through to Argentina's Corte Suprema de Jus-
ticia de la Naci6n (Supreme Court). It will also analyze the merits of the
decision through a comparison to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on
constitutional issues and will explain why this comparison is appropriate.
In order to understand the details of the Massa case, it is important to
understand the background set forth in part II of this essay. Part II fo-
cuses on how the convertibility regime, the privatizations, corruption, and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amongst other factors played a
part in the crisis and will briefly present some other alternatives that
could have been implemented. Part III will present the Massa Supreme
*Ignacio Hirigoyen: BBA Finance, 1999 Southern Methodist University; BA Eco-
nomics, 1998 Southern Methodist University; Retired Professional tennis player
(1999-2004); Candidate for Juris Doctor, Southern Methodist University, May
2009; Special thanks to Professor Joe J. Norton, Maria Sofia Hirigoyen, Patricio
Oscar Defranchi, Lisa Rae Hirigoyen, for your help and guidance.
1. Duhalde was appointed interim President of Argentina by the Legislative Assem-
bly on January 2, 2002, during an unclear series of events that some people deemed
as a conspiracy. Initially, he was to serve for a few months, until the chaotic situa-
tion of the country could be controlled. But Duhalde stayed in office for more than
one year. During this time, he confirmed the default of most of the Argentine
public debt and ended the unsustainable peg of the Argentine peso to the U.S.
dollar, which triggered inflation and massive discontent. Duhalde managed to sta-
bilize the turmoil and under some political pressure called for elections.
2. Public Emergency and Currency Exchange Reform Act, Law No. 25561, June 1,
2002, [29810] B.O. 1-2 (Arg.).
3. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/2006, "Massa, Juan Agustfn v. Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional-dto. 1570/01 y otro s/ amparo ley 16.986," Fallos (M.2771.XLI)
(Arg.).
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Court decision with contrasting U.S. Supreme Court decisions, address
similarities and differences in their reasoning, and explain why the Court
seems to be arriving at more equitable decisions with the passing of time.
Part IV of this essay analyzes U.S. Supreme Court decisions and draws
parallels to Massa, evaluating Argentina's Supreme Court decision from
another perspective. Part V concludes with the lessons learned from the
Massa decision and Argentina's crisis.
II. BACKGROUND
The demise of Argentina's banking system was the result of a combina-
tion of many factors. These factors included (1) three years of increasing
economic recession (which itself was largely a result of both ail over-
valued Argentine peso and negative effects of the Mexican, Brazilian,
and Asian crises), and (2) a currency convertibility policy that fixed the
exchange rate of each Argentine peso to one U.S. dollar during the
1990s. 4 The convertibility plan helped achieve the short term goal of con-
trolling inflation but masked vulnerabilities of Argentina's economy that
resurfaced later and exacerbated the crisis.5 Moreover, a high level of
corruption at almost every political level increased Argentines' lack of
trust in their government and economy (which itself contributed to the
deposit exodus). 6 At the macroeconomic level, the failure of the econo-
mies of countries that used similar convertibility regimes (also known as
hard peg policies) to revive their economies was a factor in Argentina's
economy losing world wide credibility. This loss of credibility led to a
halt in foreign investment and promoted a huge bank deposit exodus that
resulted in economic recess. 7
4. FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1990s 401 (Douglas Arner, Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, &
Zhongfei Zhou, eds., British Inst. of Int'l & Comparative) (2002).
5. See id.
6. Daniel Kurtz Phelan, Lost Savings, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2002, http://www.
legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2002/scene-phelan-novdec2002.msp
(indicating the Argentines' perception of corruption.). The government of Argen-
tina maintains that official corruption has decreased dramatically as a result of the
privatization of most state enterprises over the past decade. Argentina is a party to
the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) Anti-Corruption Convention and
ratified the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(O.E.C.D.) Anti-Corruption Convention in 2001. The government has regulations
against bribery of government officials, but enforcement is uncertain. An anti-
corruption office under the Ministry of Justice reviews the financial disclosure
statements that are now required of all senior public officials. Press reports indi-
cate, however, that some public officials have refused to provide the required dis-
closure statements on the grounds that compliance would expose them to
kidnapping attempts. The anti-corruption office also carries out investigations into
cases of alleged corruption involving executive branch officials. Id.
7. Joseph Stiglitz, Lessons from Argentina's Debacle, SAND iM GETRIEBE (Associa-
tion for Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens (ATAC)/ Argentina),
Jan. 9, 2002, http://attac.org. East Asia's crisis of 1997 became a global financial
crisis, raising interest rates for all emerging markets, including Argentina. Argen-
tina's exchange system survived, but at a heavy price-double digit unemploy-
ment. Soon, high interest rates strained the country's budget. With 20 percent
interest rates, 9 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) was spent
annually on financing its debt. The U.S. dollar, to which Argentinia's peso was
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The high magnitude of Argentina's banking crisis negatively impacted
the country not only economically but also socially and politically.
Argentines revolted on December 21, 2001 brought down then President
Fernando de La Rua, and went through five presidents during a ten day
period until Eduardo Duhalde was appointed by Congress to govern the
country as interim President until there was time to hold constitutional
presidential elections. During that period of time, President Duhalde
made use of special powers granted by Congress according to section 96
CN.8 The use or abuse of said emergency powers during the crisis was
and still is a source of much litigation.
In order to understand the magnitude of the crisis, it is necessary to
understand the history of Argentina's privatization activities and currency
convertibility policies, how they worked, what they ostensibly did, and
their strengths and weaknesses.
A. ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE 1990s, PRIVATIZATIONS
AND CONVERTIBILITY
Privatization of state-owned companies and full peso-convertibility
were economic tools used in Argentina during the 1990s to combat the
severe hyperinflation experienced by Argentina in 1989 and 1990.9 Their
objective was to stabilize a highly volatile economy that was resulting in
social unrest.10 Under this economic regime, Argentina achieved its de-
sired stabilization fairly quickly." The goal of privatizations was to gen-
erate revenue by attracting foreign investment in order to finance public
debt without resorting to inflationary financing. 12 Privatizations were in-
tended to have a double effect: first, to increase the state reserves
through the money obtained from the sale of large state-owned enter-
prises (between 1991 and 1994, the government privatized 90 percent of
all state-owned enterprises for an amount equivalent to U.S. $20 billion
dollars); and second, to reduce the operating deficits that those large en-
terprises historically imposed on the state. 13 According to Argentine
Central Bank President Javier Gonzalez Fraga, "privatizations [were] Ar-
tied, increased sharply in value. Meanwhile, Argentina's Mercosur trading part-
ner, Brazil, saw its currency depreciate. Wages and prices fell, but not enough to
allow Argentina to compete effectively.
8. CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA [CONST. ARC.] § 96. The second ballot, when appro-
priate, shall be held between the two voting formulas of the most voted candidates,
within thirty days of the previous election. After twelve days and after agreeing to
default on its foreign debt, Argentina declared Senator Eduardo Duhalde as in-
terim President. Days after becoming President of Argentina and after being ap-
proved by a majority of the opposition, Duhalde decreed Law 25.561 (pesification
of bank deposits). See Law No. 25561, [29810] B.O. 1-2.
9. IMF Policy and the Argentine Crisis, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 155, 187 n.1.
10. Id.
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement of John B. Taylor, Under
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs before the Subcommittee on
International Monetary Policy and Trade of the House Financial Services Commit-
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gentina's major tool in the process of debt reduction. 1 4 This does not
suggest that economic performance, politics, or ideology have played no
part in Argentina's privatizations, but merely that they have been secon-
dary to debt concerns. 15 Other goals of Latin American privatizations,
including cutting corruption, restoring government credibility, attracting
foreign investment, reducing public spending, and gaining access to credit
markets were also in existence during early 1990 in Argentina. 16
The convertibility system was established in 1991 by Law No. 2392817
and was sustained by three basic principles: (1) the convertible currency
(or hard peg), (2) the prohibition of indexation 18 (because of suspicion
that indexation was the cause of inflation), and (3) the possibility of using
foreign currency for domestic transactions. 19 Basically, the Republic of
Argentina's Central Bank (BCRA) had to provide full convertibility be-
tween pesos and U.S. dollars at a 1 peso/$1 ratio while exchange controls
were eliminated.20 The strength of the system depended on the capacity
of the BCRA to keep reserves in U.S. dollars supporting the value of the
peso.2' According to Law No. 23928, the reserves in U.S. dollars and
gold should be at least equal to 100 percent of the monetary flow. 22
But the program resulted in most people (including Argentines) believ-
ing that the peso was overvalued.2 3 As a result, most citizens converted
their deposits into U.S. currency as rapidly as possible.24 In addition, Ar-
gentina became more dependent on imports from countries with free
floating currencies and cheaper goods.25 Problems arose when the high
growth rate in Argentina's economy left it with increasing foreign indebt-
edness and trade deficits, both warning signs masked initially by the reve-
nues from the privatizations.2 6
Nevertheless, as a result of both privatization and convertibility plans,
Argentina had ten prosperous years, from 1991 to 2001.27 But President




17. Law about Convertibility of the Austral, Law 23928, Mar. 28, 1991, [27104] B.O. 1,
amended by Law about Convertibility, Law No. 25445, June 22,1001, [29675] B.O.
1 (Arg.).
18. Indexation refers to the automatic adjustment of an economic variable, such as
wages, taxes, or pension benefits, to a cost-of-living index, so that the variable rises
or falls in accordance with the rate of inflation.








27. Doug Casey, What's Next for Argentina?, WORLD NoTE DAILY, Aug. 1, 2002
(Doug Casey is the author of the best sellers Strategic Investing, Crisis Investing
and Crisis Investing for the Rest of the 90's.)
BANK CRISIS IN ARGENTINA
Menem's 28 reforms were half-measures at best-the equivalent of giving
vitamins and amphetamines to a cancer patient. They were completely
inadequate to cure the rot; therefore, the latent crisis resurfaced at last.2 9
B. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)
The IMF had a large role in shaping the 1990 Argentine economy 30 .
As one commentator stated:
Argentina followed the IMF model faithfully, more faithfully, than
almost any other nation. Its economy was opened wide. Its peso was
pegged to the dollar. For a few years it sparked an investment boom
as foreigners bought most of the country's patrimony-its banks,
phone companies, gas water, electricity, railroads, airlines, airports,
postal service, even its subways. As long as this money came in,
there were enough dollars to keep plenty of pesos in circulation. But
the dollar-to-peso peg led to an overvalued currency which killed Ar-
gentine exports, and once there was little more to sell off, the dollars
ceased coming in, which pulled money out of local circulation. As
Argentina tanked, the IMF's austerity program pushed the economy
further into collapse. 31
The role of the IMF has been widely criticized for its actions in many
countries around the world.32 Some are of the opinion that the IMF's
policy pattern is as clear in Argentina as in previous collapses around the
globe.33 It gives countries bad economic advice, then lends heavily to
them, allows them to waste the new funds, and watches as the govern-
ment's popularity plummets. 34 When the economic crisis is deep, the
IMF blames the government and pulls the plug, knowing that it always
gets paid first and in full.35 In Argentina, as elsewhere, the population
and the private sector are left holding the bag.36 The result is a country
more deeply impoverished than it would have been without IMF's in-
volvement. 37 In Argentina's crisis, the most often criticized point on the
28. Carlos Menen was President of Argentina for eight years, and was responsible for
convertibility and the privatizations that took place in Argentina during the 1990s.
29. See generally, Casey, supra note 27.
30. Argentina's Economic Meltdown: Causes and Remedies: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on International Monetary Policy and Trade, Comm. on Financial Servs.,
107th Cong. 52 (2002), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/archive/hear-
ings.as@formmode=detail&hearing=88.html.
31. Id. at 4 (statement of Dr. John Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Inter-
national Affairs, quoting from Robert Kuttner in the AMERICAN PROSPECT).
There is disagreement amongst economists regarding the fact that Argentina's
peso was overvalued. See Steve H. Hanke, Argentina: Caveat Lector 4, at lesson 2
(Cato Inst., White Paper, Oct. 17, 2002) ('If you are "politically correct," being
factually incorrect does not matter.), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpa-
pers/hanke-021017.pdf.
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IMF's role is that the IMF continued lending money to Argentina even
though Argentina was not fully meeting IMF's demands.38 The IMF and
Argentina agreed to an austerity plan. 39 Although Argentina on more
than one occasion failed to comply with the plan's guidelines, the IMF
continued to loan funds.40 This funding policy did nothing more than to
push them headlong in to a depression as the increased debt to the IMF
would be paid at the expense of the private sector.41
On the other hand, others are of the opinion that the IMF allowed
Argentina to have a very relaxed way to comply with its demands, and
Argentina is as much or more to blame than the IMF for mismanaging
the funds.42 Irrespective of the role of the IMF, there should be no deny-
ing the fact that the chief wrongdoer in Argentina's collapse was the gov-
ernment and not the IMF. But, even assuming the IMF was attempting
to be an understanding lender, it is difficult for the IMF to avoid scrutiny
when its superior status allows it to be repaid irrespective of whether the
government fails, and always at the expense of the private citizens of the
country. At some point, the bartender has some responsibility for the
activities of his drunken patron.
C. THE ROAD TO THE CRISIS
1. Macroeconomic Factors
Argentina could have recognized the symptoms of the crisis from the
example of East Asia in 1997. East Asia's crisis was due in part to several
of the same key factors: (1) strong economic growth but an
overdependence on domestic demand without enough expansion in ex-
ports, (2) aggressive expansion of loans provided by banks, and (3) exces-
sive and increased borrowing from the international interbank in the
public and private sector leading to dangerous credit exposures. 43 In
1997, Argentina could have (after Mexico's and Asia's crises) started
thinking about devaluing the currency, and if not then, certainly after
Brazil devalued in 1998.44 Brazil's devaluation also affected Argentina's
dealings in the MERCOSUR. 45
In late 1998, Argentina entered an economic decline that was to last for




41. See generally id.
42. Id. at 62; International Monetary Fund and the National Interests of the United
States: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement
of Dr. C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics, Argen-
tina's Economic Meltdown: Causes and Remedies).
43. Hanke, supra note 31.
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also Inoue, supra note 14.
46. Kurt Schuler, Ignorance and Influence: U.S. Economists on Argentina's Depression
of 1998-2002, 2 ECON. JOURNAL WATCH 234-278 (2005).
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trading partner, devalued its currency substantially in January 1999.4 7
Argentina could not devalue under the convertibility system it then
had.48 As time passed, what started as a recession turned into a depres-
sion.49 Argentina's economy declined further, suffering its two worst
quarters on record. 50 It finally hit bottom around August 2002.51 Com-
mentators on Argentina's crisis have suggested a number of causes for it.
A nearly exhaustive list includes: (1) the effect of the convertibility sys-
tem on the real exchange rate, competitiveness, and willingness to issue
dollar-denominated debt (bearing in mind that most observers consid-
ered the convertibility system to be a currency board), (2) external
shocks, such as the reduced inflow of foreign capital, (3) budget deficits
and their effect on the sustainability of the government debt, (4) inflexi-
ble labor markets, (5) three big tax increases the Argentine government
imposed from January 2000 to August 2001, (6) mistakes by the IMEF, and
(7) political blunders by the Argentine government that reduced confi-
dence in the economy, such as by upsetting established property rights.52
Almost all commentators agreed that the convertibility system lacked
credibility over the last several months of its existence.53 Recommenda-
tions for replacing the system fell into two major groups. 54 A majority
favored a floating exchange rate, heavily managed if necessary and possi-
bly supported by extensive exchange controls and forced conversion of
dollar assets into pesos.55 A significant minority favored official dol-
larization at one peso per dollar (at least before the government devalued
the peso in early 2002).56 A few remaining commentators held intermedi-
ate positions, such as favoring dollarization combined with a one-shot
devaluation.57
2. Economic Crisis Led to Social Crisis that Led to a Political Crisis
and its Aftermath Enhanced the Social Crisis
Imports in Argentina grew dramatically by 600 percent from 1990 to
2000, wiping out 1500 textile factories, 1200 shoe factories, 360 auto part
makers and 150 toy factories. 58 The economic crisis developed into a po-
litical crisis that started by bringing down from office President De la
Rua. Thereafter, Argentina went through five presidents in ten days.
The fifth and last President during the crisis (Duhalde) made use of spe-
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plan, which helped to exacerbate the already existing banking crisis. Af-
ter ten years of convertibility (at 1 peso/1 dollar ratio), Argentine's would
use U.S. dollars and Argentine pesos indistinctively for any kind of trans-
action. The majority would keep bank deposits in U.S. dollars as a hedg-
ing measure as most Argentines expected that such parity was not going
to exist forever and the peso would devaluate eventually.
This added yet another layer to the crisis since the President, who en-
joyed special powers granted by Congress, decreed that all bank deposits,
in any currency, be converted to Argentine pesos. Decree 214/2002,59
which pesificated6° all bank deposits, combined with the devaluation of
the peso, and resulted in citizens' bank deposits' values decreasing ini-
tially by 40 percent with respect to the U.S. dollar. Decree 214/2002 af-
fected every debtor/creditor relation; the Massa decision focuses on the
reality of bank deposit holders versus banks.
An interesting point that made the situation even worse is that on the
month before the crisis reached its peak, in order to prevent bank insol-
vency, Argentina's Minister of Economy implemented the El Corralito
59. Financial System Restructuring, Decree No. 214, Feb. 3, 2002, [29830] B.O. 1-2
(Arg.).
Conversi6n a pesos de las obligaciones de dar sumas de dinero, de cual-
quier causa u origen, expresadas en [d]6lares [e]stadounidenses u otras
monedas extranjeras, existentes a la sanci6n de la Ley 25561[, y de los
dep6sitos en [dichas] monedas ... en el sistema financiero .,. [R]elaci6n
de cambio... [C]oeficiente de Estabilizaci6n de Referencia... [E]misi6n
de un Bono ... [a] cargo del Tesoro Nacional para solventar el dese-
quilibrio [resultante de la diferencia de cambio que se establece]. Sus-
pen[si6n de] procesos judiciales y medidas cautelares y ejecutorias
relacionadas con el Decreto 1570/2001 ... , la Ley 25561, el Decreto 71/
2002 ... y el presente decreto. Modiffca[se] la Ley 21526 de Entidades
Financieras N 21.526. Global Legal Information Network, Summary Re-
cord of Decree 214, http://www.glin.gov/search.action (search for
"125266," limit search by "Source Number (GLIN Number, etc.)").
Obligations to deliver money, for any reason or origin, expressed in
United States Dollars or other foreign currency, existent by the enact-
ment of Law 25561 (Public Emergency and Exchange Rate Reform) are
converted to Pesos. Deposits in Dollars or other foreign currency exis-
tent in the financial system shall be converted to Pesos.. Debts in Dollars
or other foreign currency are converted to Pesos. A Reference Stabiliza-
tion Coefficient is to be applied to Foreign currency deposits and foreign
currency debts. Obligations of any nature or origin arising after the
enactement of Law 25561 cannot include nor be subject to adjustment
clauses. Stipulates the issue of Bonds to be debited from funds of the
National Treasury intended to settle the financial imbalance, and the is-
sue of Bonds in United States Dollars to be debitted from funds of the
National Treasury, which can be chosen by deposit-holders in the finan-
cial system to substitute the refund of deposits. Judicial claims, prelimi-
nary injunctions and the execution of judgements related to Decree 1570/
2001 (Rules to which Financial Entities are to fit their operations), Law
25561, Decree 71/2002 (Standards regulating exchange rate provisions
stipulated by Law 25561) and the present Decree, are suspended. Law
21526 about Financial Entities is modified. Id.
60. Pesification refers to the conversion of every U.S. dollar in the economy to Argen-
tine pesos.
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program61 (translated in English to little stockyard, which is of no partic-
ular meaning). El Corralito was implemented as a mandatory method of
economic austerity to prevent bank insolvency. Fearing that people
would rush to the bank to withdraw all their bank deposits, which would
create a bank crisis, El Corralito only let deposit holders withdraw $250
(pesos/dollars) per week per bank account. 62 This is the reason why
when the pesification took place, people still had money trapped in the
banks. Moreover, on top of El Corralito, the government proclaimed
Law 25466 (Intangibilidad de los Depositos)63 stating that bank deposits
were not to be touched by the government. Such a decree seemed to
serve no purpose since the Argentine constitution grants a right to prop-
erty that includes bank deposits as property and by no means can the
state deprive citizens of their personal property.64
This set of events economically hurt Argentines very deeply; hence it
was the source of much litigation by the people dealing with the constitu-
tionality of the emergency decrees and issues with property rights.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS: THE MASSA CASE
Argentina uses code law, and thus relies on statutory interpretation
and not judicial precedent for resolving disputes. 65 There existed no such
legislation on the civil code to resolve issues surrounding the appropriate-
ness of the emergency decrees. 66 Moreover, civil code courts treat case
precedent as mere persuasive arguments and not mandatory. 67 The Ar-
gentina Supreme Court thus acted as a court of equity and took the high
burden of institutional, political, and social repercussions that its deci-
sions would impart. Such fact makes relevant the comparison to U.S Su-
preme Court decisions (which often consider equitable principles)
dealing with constitutional issues during emergency times. Social peace is
the highest goal of the Supreme Court as stated in the preamble of Ar-
gentina's Constitution.68
A. FACTS AND HOLDING
Mr. Massa was the holder of deposits in Bank Boston NA (in Argen-
tina), which on December 31, 2001 had a balance of U.S. $184,475.75. He
was affected by the emergency laws promulgated during the crisis by
President Duhalde. Massa's deposits were pesificated and therefore de-
valuated, so he commenced an action against the government seeking an
injunction accion de amparo69 (a summary proceeding that serves to
61. Intangibility of deposits, Law No. 25466, art. 6, Sept. 24, 2001, [29739] B.O. 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 2.
65. CIVIL LAW (Ralf Rogowski ed., New York Press 1995).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. CONST. ARG. Preamble.
69. CONST. ARG. § 43, Accion de Amparo.
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guarantee constitutional rights) against the bank claiming that such emer-
gency laws (Law 25561 and decrees 1570/01, 71/02, 141/02, and 214/0270
and others) were unconstitutional. After the lower court (primera in-
stancia)71 granted a preliminary injunction favorable to Massa and made
the bank restitute U.S. $44,803 as a preliminary judgment, the Court
granted a recurso extraordinario to analyze the constitutionality of the
emergency laws and their encroachment into Massa's personal property
rights. Argentina's Supreme Court held that Bank Boston had to return
to the deposit holder the amount on the account in pesos at a rate of 1.4
pesos per dollar on the account plus the referential stabilization coeffi-
cient (CER), which is the result of many economic variables fixed at four
percent annually.72 Therefore, Bank Boston had to return to an amount,
according to the formula determined by the Court that would allow Mr.
Massa to purchase the same amount of U.S. dollars in the free market
(equivalent to U.S. $139,672.75).7 3 The formula worked as follows: Bank
Boston was to reintegrate Mr. Massa 1.4 pesos per U.S. dollar in the ac-
count plus a 4 percent interest per year based on price inflation and in-
creased interest rates, which in essence was to reintegrate to Massa the
whole sum that he had deposited.74 In short, the Court validated a "court
modified pesification," which allowed the Court to avoid answering on its
constitutionality.
Argentina's Supreme Court found the pesification decree 214/2002 dic-
tated by the President to not be repugnant to the Argentine Constitu-
tion.75 The Court found that even though the executive power
overstepped its boundaries by acting in a legislative manner, it did not
injure a citizen's private property because it did not alter the intrinsic
value of their bank deposits. Argentina's Constitution grants Congress
and the executive, by express delegation, the power to fix exchange rates
70. Law 25561, [29810] B.O. 1-2; Financial Entities, Decree 1570, Dec. 1, 2001, [29787]
B.O. 1-2, (Arg.); Decree 71, Sept. 1, 2002, [29813] B.O. 6; Decree 141, Jan. 17,
2002, [29819] B.O. 2; Decree 214, [29830] B.O. 1-2.
71. Primera instancia is equivalent to a trial court in the United States, but only one
judge intervenes on this process as there is no trial by jury in Argentina.
72. Economic Terms, Posting of Robert Wright to Line of Sight blog, http://www.
wrighton.com.ar/?p=396 (Jul. 5, 2006).
Coeficiente de[e]stabilizaci6n de [r]eferencia or [r]eferenced [c]oefficient
for [r]eal[v]alue [s]tabilization ... was a number based on the [clonsumer
[p]rice [i]ndex from the previous two months plus the first [six] days of
the current month and took into account the effect of inflation on all
prices. The CER varied daily, and the Central Bank published tables for
public reference. The CER was used during the first half of 2002 to cal-
culate rents, loans, and mortgages after devaluation. Later, all contracts
were renegotiated and resigned. You can imagine the mess. For exam-
ple, my previous rent was set at $340 pesos/pegged dollars by contract,
but after multiplying by the CER of March 8, 2002 (the day I paid), it
became $348 [$340 x 1.0244 = $348.30]. I signed my lease in Caballito at
340 dollars which became 348 devalued pesos or approximately 172 dol-
lars. Id. (emphasis omitted).
73. Massa, Fallos (M.2771.XLI) (holding).
74. Id. at 1 (holding)
75. Id. 1$ 20 & 21.
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between the Argentine peso and foreign currencies with the ultimate ob-
jective of safeguarding public economic order.76
B. ARGUMENTS BROUGHT FORWARD SUPPORTING
THE GOVERNMENT'S MEASURES
The Massa decision was decided mainly upon two issues (1) constitu-
tionality issues arising out of the injury to personal property and (2) the
constitutionality of the presidential decrees. It was argued that by expro-
priating the citizens' personal property, the government violated section
17 of Argentina's Constitution that guarantees the right to private prop-
erty, and that the President abused the power granted by the emergency
powers when he encroached the powers of Congress by sanctioning emer-
gency decrees. This usurpation of power would be considered unconstitu-
tional because according to the constitutional division of powers it was up
to congress and not the President to decide the fate of Argentina's
economy. 77
The constitutionality of the pesification decree 214/2002 was ques-
tioned because banks infringed on citizens' personal property rights by
not repaying their money at the rate deposited, constituting a confiscation
of property and thus violating section 17 of Argentina's Constitution.78
The Court making reference to precedent (e.g. Bustos) held that there
was no property injury claim because Congress and the President have
the power to fix exchange rates between the peso and foreign currencies,
and thus they had the power to pesificate the economy. Furthermore, the
Court in Massa reasoned that since the money was ordered to be re-
turned there was no injury to personal property and thus the govern-
ment's actions were not repugnant to the constitution. 79
Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution establishes that:
Property may not be violated and no inhabitant of the Nation can be
deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based on law. Expropri-
ation for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and
previously compensated. Only Congress levies the taxes mentioned
in Section 4. No personal service can be requested except by virtue
of law or sentence based on law. Every author or inventor is the
exclusive owner of his work, invention, or discovery for the term
granted by law. The confiscation of property is hereby abolished for-
ever from the Argentine Criminal Code. No armed body may make
requisitions nor demand assistance of any kind.80
The Court referenced to section 17 of the Constitution and noted that
under contract law, deposit holders have the duty as creditors and the
bank has the duty of the debtor, which is to return the bank deposits in
76. CONST. ARG. §§ 75-76.
77. Massa, Fallos (M.2771.XLI), Argibay, J., op., 3.
78. Id. 4.
79. Id. 15.
80. CONST. ARG. § 17.
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the same currency denomination that they were made and entrusted to
them. People have the property right over bank deposits, and such a
right is protected against any kind of authority that purports to attack
that personal property right.81 The Argentine Constitution in section 17
provides a protection similar to the one given by the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, "the due process clause;" which states that no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. 82 The phrase reflects the idea that a person's life, liberty, and prop-
erty are not subject to the complete discretion of government officials. 83
But, the Court in Massa referred to historic and recent precedent that
supports that based on monetary sovereignty, governmental interference
(like pesification here) was not repugnant to the constitution. 84 In Bus-
tos, the Court explained that Congress and the executive power are em-
powered by precedent and express legislative delegation, to fix the
exchange rates between the peso and foreign currencies with the objec-
tive of keeping public and economic order. 85 Following the Court's pre-
cedent of keeping public and economic order, the emergency laws
promulgated by the legislation were resolved to be unconstitutional. 86
The Massa Court, citing Bustos, then focused on the potential harm that
not following the Court's historic precedent would impart: "A ruling con-
trary to funcionamiento economico [the fundamental rule of precedent
effected years after established, would bring grave institutional problems
contrary to following the decision of the Court. '87
81. Id.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. An interesting fact is that Congress on September 24, 2001, before El Corralito
and pesificacion promulgated Law 25466, Law de Intangibility of Deposits, which
stated that the government would not reach into agreements between deposit
holders and banks, specifically in sections 2 and 3 of said law. Why then the
double shield? Why did the government feel the need to dictate a law that gave
citizens a right that they already had? Section 17 of the Constitution and Law
25466 both protect personal property, in this case bank deposits. At this point it is
important to consider section 28 of Constitution, which says that other national
laws should not modify the principles of the constitution. Argentina's Supreme
Court has a long history of following decisions in favor of the government dispos-
ing of private property in order to remediate social and/or economic crises. Per-
haps, given this history, the government determined it was important to give
Argentines an indication that there would be no taking of bank deposits.
84. CSJN, 26/10/2004, "Bustos, Alberto Roque y otros c/ E.N. y otros s/ amparo,"
Fallos (B.139.XXXIX) (Arg.). Causa "Bustos" [fallo en extenso elDial - AA
2520]).
85. CONST. ARG. § 75(11) ("Congress is empowered: ... To coin money, to regulate
the value thereof and that of foreign currency; and to adopt a uniform standard of
weights and measures for the whole Nation"). "The legislative powers shall not be
delegated to the Executive Power save for issues concerning administration and
public emergency, with a specified term for their exercise and according to the
delegating conditions established by Congress." Id. § 76. See also CSJN, 28/8.2001,
"Perez Hector Antonio c/ Anses reajustes por movilidad," Fallos (P.520.XXXVI),
"Avico Teresa c/ Anses," Fallos (A.749.XXXVI). In re "Avico c/ de la Pesa" (Fal-
los: 172:21).
86. See "Avico Teresa c/ Anses," Fallos (A.749.XXXVI). See also Bustos, Fallos
(B.139.XXXIX).
87. Massa, Fallos (M.2771.XLI), Argibay, J. op. 6 (quote translated by the author).
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It is worth noting that the Court's reasoning was not unanimous re-
garding the outcome in Massa. One of the Supreme Court justices, Justice
Argibay, made compelling arguments as to why Argentina's savers had in
fact suffered an infringement of their property rights. She also argued
that the way the pesification Decree 214/02 was sanctioned was
unconstitutional. 88
In her opinion, Argibay states that El Corralito and the taking of bank
deposits by the government without the creditor's consent, and the fact
that the government would not return the money for another ten years,
made it hard to support the opinion that creditors did not suffer any alter-
ation of their personal and property rights due to the government's ac-
tions.89 Furthermore, she argued that if it is found that an emergency
measure injures property rights in a "substantial and definite" manner,
such a measure could be regarded as unconstitutional. 90 Therefore, if
214/2002 had gone further than the limit established for governmental
intervention an inquiry into its constitutionality was not only adequate
but necessary. 91 Argibay also inquires about the constitutionality of De-
cree 214 through the division of powers and the executive's power to dic-
tate laws because as opposed to the legislative. 92 Section 99 of the
National Constitution, establishes that "[t]he Executive Power shall in no
event issue provisions of the legislative nature, in which case they shall be
absolutely and irreparably null and void."'93 Therefore, any disposition of
a legislative nature decreed by the executive power is found to be uncon-
stitutional unless it can be shown that specified prerequisites dictated in
the constitution are met. Section 99(3) also outlines the requisites re-
quired for the exception to take place:
Only when due to exceptional circumstances the ordinary proce-
dures foreseen by this Constitution for the enactment of laws are
impossible to be followed, and when rules are not referred to crimi-
nal issues, taxation, electoral matters, or the system of political par-
ties, he shall issue decrees on grounds of necessity and urgency,
which shall be decided by a general agreement of ministers who shall
countersign them together with the Chief of the Ministerial
Cabinet.94
Section 99(3) outlines as well, the procedure the executive power must






93. CONST. ARO § 99(3), para. 2, available at http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/Argen-
tina-Constitution.pdf.
94. Id. § 99(3), para. 2.
95. Id. § 99(3), para. 4.
Within the term of ten days, the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet shall
personally submit the decision to the consideration of the Joint Standing
Committee of Congress, which shall be composed according to the pro-
portion of the political representation of the parties in each House.
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The fact that the President invoked the privilege granted by section
99(3) of the constitution, and dictated decree 214/02 by acting as a legisla-
tor, was not contested at any point in any case; it was a known fact that he
acted as a legislator. 96 Moreover, it was also undisputed that while sanc-
tioning decree 214/02, the proper legislative procedure set forth in section
99(3) was not followed, and thus the decree was not proclaimed accord-
ing to the constitution. 97 Congress set the guidelines accordingly to sec-
tion 99(3), but the President chose not to follow them.98 According to
legal precedent, even in emergency situations, the President must abide
by the constitution.99 Therefore, there was no argument that decree 214/
02 was pronounced in transgression of section 99(3) of the constitution
and was thus, by definition, unconstitutional.100
Notwithstanding Argibay's argument attacking the constitutionality of
the emergency measures, she sided with the majority, by doing so she
undermined the validity of her arguments. The Court unanimously ruled
that the emergency measures were not unconstitutional. She joined the
majority's decision by accepting that grave institutional consequences
would follow if the Court ruled otherwise.
In short, Argentina's Supreme Court decided in Massa that the emer-
gency decrees were, in general, not repugnant to the constitution. The
Court did not declare that the pesification was constitutional. The major-
ity agreed that pesification (as seen in Massa) was constitutionally accept-
able. Justice Fayt was of the opinion that it was not necessary to
pronounce it constitutional or unconstitutional, 101 and Justice Argibay,
after voicing her disagreement, agreed with the outcome because it was
the most equitable decision.
In order to reach their decision, the Court faced several compelling
challenges on the constitutionality of the emergency measures. The
Court responded by arguing that (1) dictating law 25561 was the only
resource, (2) the constitution reserved the power to promulgate such laws
for the President, and (3) reference to U.S. precedent was very relevant.
While the general idea of resolving Massa equitably finds its basis on pro-
moting social welfare as stated in the constitution, Argentina's Supreme
Court seemed to force the outcome.
Within the term of ten days, this committee shall submit its report to the
plenary meeting of each House for its specific consideration, and it shall
be immediately discussed by both Houses. A special law enacted with
the absolute majority of all the members of each House shall regulate the
procedure and scope of Congress participation. Id.
96. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., I 7.b.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. "Avico Teresa c/ Anses," Fallos (A.749.XXXVI).
100. Id.
101. Massa, Fayt, J., 20.
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1. Decree 214/2002 was the Only Resource
The first argument was that since the crisis was of such a high magni-
tude, as section 1 of Law 25561 stated, proclaiming that Decree 214/02
was the only resource that the government had. 10 2 In order to back this
position, the argument pointed to section 64 of Law 25967 sanctioned in
December 2004, which ratified the emergency measures. 10 3 Law 25967, a
budget law, was promulgated two years after the pesification had taken
place, but in one of its sections the law ratified the power of the executive
to take measures during emergencies, which was at issue in Massa.10 4
This argument was highly criticized since nowhere in the constitution
does it allow such methods of validating any "necessity and urgency" de-
cree.' 05 The interesting fact is that by proclaiming a state of emergency
(Law 25561) made the promulgation of Decree 214/02 inevitable, hence it
was constitutional. 10 6 But before Decree 214/02 was issued, Congress es-
tablished guidelines according to section 99(3) of the Constitution that
the President had to follow in dealing with the crisis.10 7 Among the mea-
sures authorized by these guidelines, pesificacion of bank deposits was
not one of them.'0 8 In fact, Congress resolved to do just the opposite by
keeping the peso pegged to the U.S. dollar.'0 9 Section 6 of Law 25561,
Emergency and Reform of Currency Exchange Regime, (now Law
25820110) emphasizes that the executive would restructure the debt with
the banks (at 1 peso/1 dollar ratio) only in cases where the amount did
not exceed U.S. $100,000 and where the debt consisted of either (1) hy-
poteques or mortgage loans for home purchases, (2) home improvement
loans, (3) personal loans, (4) car loans, (5) individuals of corporations
that qualify as small or medium size businesses, or (6) up to said amount
in cases such as (1) if the loan is for a family home, and (5) above.'
Shifting the emphasis to the last paragraph of Law 25561, it was argued
that the word "restructuring" only granted the government the power to
modify the time of repayment and the interest rates regarding bank de-
posits. 112 Therefore, implied in the above mentioned law was Congress'
will to return bank deposits in the same denomination in which they were
made and that the time of repayment and the interest rate could be modi-
fied.113 Thus, the executive would be able to take compensatory mea-
102. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., 7.a.
103. Id; See also General Budget of the Federal Government, Law No. 25967, Nov. 24,
2004, [30549] B.O. 1-8 (Arg.); Presupuesto General de ]a Administraci6n Nacional,
Decree No. 1852, Dec. 16, 2004, BO., art. 47 (Arg.).
104. See generally Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., T 7.b.
105. Id. See also CONST. ARG. § 99(3).
106. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., I 7.a.
107. Law No. 25561, [29810] B.O. 1-2; see also CONST. ARG. § 99(3).
108. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., I 7.a.
109. Id.
110. Public Emergency and Reform of the Exchange Rate Regime, Law No. 25820,
Dec. 2, 2003, [30291] B.O. 1 (Arg.).
111. Law No. 25561, [29810] B.O. 1-2.
112. Id. art. 6.
113. Id.
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sures to counteract the imbalance affected by the measures proclaimed
above, such as guaranteed government bonds in foreign currency denomi-
nations as consistent with the takings clause of the Argentine Constitu-
tion.114 In other words, Congress decided that the executive could take
the necessary measures to ensure preservation of the capital belonging to
savers that deposited money in banks on the date stated in the El Corral-
ito decree 1570/2001, restructuring it accordingly to the solvency situation
at the moment. This protection encompassed bank deposits in foreign
currency denominations.1 15 The objective of section 6 of Law 25561 was
to ratify Congress' intent to reintegrate bank deposits equivalent in value
to the amount in which they were made irrespective of its denomina-
tion.116 According to the requirements set forth in section 99(3) of the
Constitution, Law 25561 was ready and would have been operative. It
provided the guidelines that the executive would follow. In section 6, it
outlined the emergency program that granted the President the power to
interfere with personal property but only by extending the time of repay-
ment and putting a ceiling on interest rates. The President disregarded
the guidelines set in the Law 25561 and thus the pesification decree
should have been declared unconstitutional.
The stringent standard required when dealing with purging the uncon-
stitutionality of facts that are presumed constitutional by delegation, re-
quires a convincing and irrefutable showing that the measure being
evaluated be "irreplaceable and just" and to serve to an imminent neces-
sity that can not wait.117 Thus, it could have been argued that Law 25561
was not sophisticated enough to deal with the crisis by itself and that the
decision to "step beyond congress' guidelines was therefore neces-
sary. 1 18 The argument could have pointed to the fact that it would have
not been sufficient to just extend the time of repayment and limit the
interest rates of the bank deposits, as Congress originally thought possi-
ble.119 Therefore, in order to deal with an imminent crisis of such a mag-
nitude, the emergency measures dictated by the President were in fact
necessary and could not wait.120 But this was never argued although it
would have helped support the Court's ruling.
Congress delayed addressing a solution for almost three years, and
when it finally got around to coming up with a solution, it did so only by a
114. See id.
115. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., I 7.a.
116. DIARIO DE SESSIONES DE LA CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACION, 5 de
Enero del 2002.. (copy at http://www.diputados.gov.ar/ (solicited via email). Arti-
cle 6 makes a distinction between debts between the private sector and banks,
greater and smaller than U.S. $100.000. Amounts greater than U.S. $100,000 would
be returned in the same denomination they were made, amounts less that U.S.
$100,000 at a ratio of lpeso/ldollar. (Massa, Fallos (M.2771.XLI), Argibay, J., op.,
I 7.a.
117. Id.
118. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI].
119. Id.
120. Id.
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section of a later-promulgated law (Ley de Presupuesto 21) without al-
lowing for much of any debate. Such a set of events is by all means unac-
ceptable since it not only violated constitutional due process, but also
frustrated section 99(3)'s purpose, which was to (1) assure a "seasonable
and public"1 22 resolution, since three years could not be considered to be
a seasonable decision, and (2) during a congressional session, in order to
decide either the ratification or rejection of such necessity and urgency
decrees, which might have been complied in part but considering that the
issue at hand would render such an important decision, it should have
been addressed by itself.
2. The Constitution Reserved the Power for President to Promulgate
Decree 214/2002
Decree 214/02 was also evaluated not as a disposition legislative in
character (even though it was sanctioned as an urgency and necessity de-
cree meeting legislative criterion), but as one reserved for the President
by the Constitution. The idea behind the argument was that since it was a
reserved power, there was no constitutional or property rights viola-
tion.123 Under this view, the deposit holders would have been compen-
sated in pesos according to the money they had in the bank, thus their
acquisitive power would not have changed. 124 This, the argument states,
would have been constitutional because Decree 214/02 would have not
overstepped the limits set by the emergency plan approved by Law 25561,
since it was a reserved power. 125
This reasoning was incomplete, since it infers that deposit holders did
not suffer any economical injury based only on their expectation to pre-
serve their wealth respective to Argentina's economy. Comparing only
domestic wealth, however, the scenario would not have been altered by
Decree 214, since the devaluation of Argentina's economy kept the buy-
ing power of the peso proportional by reducing goods and services' prices
in the economy. 126 The government also made reference to section 2 of
Decree 214/02, which fixed the exchange rate at 40 percent higher than
other obligations affected by the pesification, therefore implying that
Argentines were better off by a forty percent increase in their wealth.127
The flaw in the reasoning was that it considered that the capital deposited
in the banks was destined only for consuming or investing in the local
market and not in foreign ones.128 It also takes for granted that the con-
sumption or investing would have been done locally in goods or services
121. Law. No. 25967, [30549] B.O. 1-8 (the Budget Law).
122. Massa, Argibay, J., 9 7(b).
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that did not follow the dollar's evolution.129
3. U.S. Jurisprudence is on Point Because the Issue is One of Power,
Not Purely Economic
The last argument addressed by the Court was based on comparing
Massa and the pesification crisis to U.S. Supreme Court decisions during
the Gold Repeal Joint Resolution. 130
During the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a law seeking to
rescind a clause whereby creditors could demand payment in gold coin.' 3 '
In all of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Gold Repeal Joint Resolution as a valid exercise of the power of
Congress over the monetary system expressly delegated to it by the U.S.
Constitution. 132 The government argued that it had the power, granted
by the Constitution, to fix exchange rates. Argentina's Supreme Court
reached the same outcome as the U.S. Supreme Court in its decisions. 133
But Argentina's Supreme Court in Massa stated that it ruled in such a
way because not following such an ancient precedent would have brought
institutional chaos. 34 The Massa Court can find ample support in U.S.
precedent. The only difference between the two jurisprudences is that in
the U.S. cases, Congress came up with the guidelines on how to imple-
ment the use of the U.S. dollar over gold, and the President abided by
those guidelines. In Argentina's case, the President did not. Argentina's
Congress, in 2002, did not produce any resolution that supported presi-
dential interference affecting bank contracts. In fact, it promulgated Law
25561, which ordered banks to preserve the value of people's bank depos-
its and not to pesificate. But the comparison is still very relevant. Argen-
tina was experiencing a political social and economic crisis and the
question of emergency decisions was one of power. Argentina's Consti-
tution, in cases of emergency, broadens presidential powers in a much
broader manner than the U.S. Constitution. 35 Thus, it would be more
appropriate to analyze whether in an emergency situation, like the one
129. Id.
130. See generally Perry v. U. S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935); U.S. v. Bankers Trust Co., 294
U.S. 240 (1935). The Perry and the Bankers Trust Company cases are known as
the Gold Clause Cases and were decided on February 18, 1935. The constitutional-
ity of the Gold Repeal Joint Resolution was challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court
in these Gold Clause Cases. See also Norman v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S.
240 (1935) (a suit involving a railroad-coupon of issued on February 1, 1930, with
4.5 times its value due on February 1, 1960); U. S. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Bankers Trust Co., (involving the gold clauses in bonds issued by the St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. on May 1, 1903, and due May 1, 1933).
These latter cases were also decided together.
131. Nortz v. U. S., 294 U.S. 317 (1935) (concerning the gold clause in gold certificates,
series of 1928); Perry, 294 U.S. at 330 (involving the gold clause in liberty bonds
issued under the Act of September 24, 1917).
132. See generally Perry, 294 U.S. at 330; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE
(Glenn G. Munn, F.L. Garcia, & Charles J. Woelfel, 9th ed., Salem Press 1993).
133. See generally Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], holding.
134. Id.
135. Avico, Fallos (A.749.XXXVI), holding, at 1.
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experienced in Argentina during 2001, and according to Argentina's Su-
preme Court precedent, the government would have had the power to
promulgate the emergency decrees over the legislative branch. This issue
is further addressed in section C below.
4. Other Issues Considered by the Massa Court in Reaching Their
Decision
These are some of the other factors playing a lesser role in the Massa
decision. The Court considered the following factors:
1. The laws promulgated during the 2001-2002 crisis came from prece-
dents from the same Court and it would negatively impact the judi-
cial system to have applied this decision retrospectively (Argentina
has no rule against ex post facto laws, their application backwards is
determined by the Court)
2. After five years, there were many factors affecting judicial decisions
3. It was necessary to analyze the macroeconomic repercussions of the
decisions made by Congress.
4. The decisions over constitutional protection of contracts and per-
sonal property would have had a very important effect over institu-
tional evolution in Argentina.
5. Declaring a law unconstitutional would be unnecessary when there
were other tools to resolve the issue granted by the law.
6. Judges have ruled in many different ways on this issue showing the
disparity in criterion of our society.
7. It was necessary to arrive to a definite solution to these kinds of
problems in order to promote social peace, especially when concern-
ing savers rights.
8. And, the Argentina Supreme Court had to abide by law to the Con-
stitution, which ruled the Court. 136
In Massa, the Court arrived at what seems like the most equitable deci-
sion possible. While Justice Argibay made very compelling arguments
regarding the unconstitutionality of the emergency decrees, she recog-
nized in the end that the plurality was seeking to put an end to these
kinds of disputes. Thus, Justice Argibay agreed in general with the result
arrived at by the majority and joined.
C. PREVIOUS ARGENTINA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON GOVERNMENT TAKINGS
The Supreme Court decisions during the crisis shifted years of case pre-
cedent, which had always sided with expanding presidential powers re-
garding these kinds of cases. 137 Thus, Massa was not the first case
136. Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Lorenzetti, J., concurring op., 24.
137. Jonathan M. Miller, Evaluating the Argentine Supreme Court Under Presidents Al-
fonsin and Menem (1983-1999), 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 369, 395 (2000) ("On
several occasions the President and his allies publicly admitted that they sought an
expanded Court to avoid the risk of opposition to government policies."). See also
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decided by Argentina's Supreme Court regarding taking issues.138 When
litigation arose after the 2001 crisis, Argentina's Supreme Court status
regarding some of the issues was unclear, which made the rulings very
unpredictable. Massa seemed to have reconciled most of the trouble-
some issues the Court faced and was thought to be a common ground
decision that the Court and Argentina's citizens could adjust to and live
with. The following two Argentina Supreme Court decisions will high-
light some of the controversies on the way to reaching the Massa
decision.
1. Supreme Court Decision: "Smith v. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional"
1/2/2002139
One of the first cases in which Argentina's Supreme Court decided the
pesification and El Corralito issues was Smith. This was a very controver-
sial decision because it went against the Supreme Court's set precedent of
expanding presidential powers in times of emergency.1 40
The Court in Smith declared the emergency laws unconstitutional be-
cause they affected property rights granted by section 17 of the Constitu-
tion. The Court reasoned that the acquired rights doctrine in Argentina's
Constitution grants rights that are not rescindable, and thus the savers
suffered property injury. Argentina's Supreme Court declared El Corral-
ito unconstitutional on February 1, 2002 in its Smith decision. 141 Even
though the Supreme Court ruled against El Corralito, President Duhalde
made use of his emergency powers granted to him by Congress and
banned further legal challenges to El Corralito.142 The Court indepen-
dently continued granting injunctions that ordered the return of deposits
to tens of thousands of savers. El Corralito's restrictions were eased in
October and November 2002, and abolished by December 2, 2002.
2. The Bustos Case-the Implementation of the Shared Effort
Doctrine143
In Bustos, contrary to Smith, the Court applied the shared efforts doc-
trine and declared that the pesification decrees were not unconstitutional
because there had been no injury to personal property. 44 The Court
based its decision on the following considerations:
CSJN, 27/12/1990, "Peralta c/ Estado Nacional," Fallos (1990-313-1513) 40-44, &
52.
138. Millar, supra note 136, at 399-407.
139. CSJN, 1/2/2002, Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires s/ solicita intervenci6n urgente
en autos: "Smith, Carlos Antonio c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional o Estado Nacional
s/ sumarfsimo," Fallos (B.32.XXXVIII).
140. Id.
141. Smith v. Estado Nacional, 1/2/2002, J.A. (2002-1-237); see also La Corte Puso Fin al
Corralito, DIARIO JUDICIAL, Feb. 1, 2002, http://www.diariojudicial.com/nota.asp?
IDNoticia=3689.
142. Devaluation's Downbeat Start, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2002, at 34.
143. Bustos, Fallos (B.139.XXXIX), holding, at 1.
144. Id.
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1. During an economic emergency the legislative and executive powers
enjoy broader powers
2. The Constitution does not recognize absolute rights during eco-
nomic and social turmoil because those rights are subordinated to
the Nation's welfare.
3. The savers did not suffer because of pesification as long as they
could get back an amount that would have the same intrinsic value
as the original deposit (in the domestic arena).
4. And, the shared effort doctrine was a more equitable way of dealing
with pesification issues.145
The shared effort doctrine was manufactured by the Court in order to
recognize that both debtor and creditors were victims of the crisis in one
way or the other. 146 The doctrine sought to avoid recognizing individual
rights by hurting Argentina's social welfare.1 47 In other words, the Court
reasoned that returning deposits in their original denomination would
amount to a complete disregard of Argentina's then present reality, thus
greatly privileging a sector of the country, while injuring the rest. 148 The
way that money was distributed in a shared efforts decision was at the
rate of 1.8 pesos per dollar. While coming up with the shared efforts
doctrine, the Court put some of the blame on the savers because of their
constant mistrust of the peso.' 49 The Court criticized the deposit holders
wanting to insure a constant acquisitive power regardless of how their
country's economy did and the expense placed on the economy. 150 The
Court mentioned that it was obvious that the deposits were made in U.S.
dollars because savers had doubts that the acquisitive power of the peso
would be maintained, and thus attempted to maintain the intrinsic value
of their capital by keeping the stronger currency. 51 By saving in U.S.
dollars, the savers were depleting the support of Argentina's economy
(the dollar), and thus the Court reasoned, they should share the blame of
Argentina's economic failure.152
It is worth noting that while Smith and Bustos come out on different
ends, the reality in Argentina had changed during the time period be-
tween when the decisions were rendered. Two years had passed since
Smith, and Argentina had a healthier economy. Also during Smith, some
of the justices were undergoing impeachment by the government, which
sheds doubt as to the judges' motives while deciding the case because of
threats of losing their jobs. Two years later, in Bustos, the Court faced
145. Id. See also Maria Jenkis, Fallo Bustos: Convalidaci6n de la Pesificaci6n, LATIN
COUNSEL.COM, Nov. 10, 2004, http://www.latincounsel.com/esp/noticiaampliada.
php?nid=4696.
146. Id.
147. Id. See also XIX Jornadas Nacionales de Derecho Civil, Rosario, Septiembre del
2003, http://jornadascivil.eurofull.comlimg/XXI-JNDC-19_JornNacDerCivil.htm.
148. Id.
149. Bustos, Fallos (B.139.XXXIX), Fayt, J., op. 7.
150. See id. 7.
151. Id. 7.
152, Id. T 7.
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demand by the deposit holders, for reimbursement of their deposits in
U.S. dollars with the added claim that it was imperative for them to get
back dollars and not pesos. The Court highlighted the fact that the savers
had the initial chance of getting dollars when the government offered, at
the beginning of the crisis, an option for ten-year bonds payable in dollars
for those savers that would choose not to seek legal action. The Court
reasoned that if the savers declined that option, maybe keeping the dollar
value was not as imperative as they claimed.' 5 3 "All citizens must surren-
der their individual interests in favor of social welfare."'1 54 One of the
arguments advanced by the government in Bustos was that there existed
no injury to property, since it was upon the government to decide how to
repay the deposits, and therefore, the Court should have no voice in the
matter. It was up to the government to care for the country's welfare. 155
In 2006, while deciding Massa, two more years had gone by and the econ-
omy was in even better shape than when Bustos was decided. It seemed
that the Court had finally landed a sound decision which could reconcile
the issues equitably. The emergency laws were declared to not be repug-
nant to the constitution, and in recognizing the harshness of the crisis, the
Court came up with a formula that required the banks to repay the
money at a rate of 1 U.S. dollar /1.4 pesos plus CER. This decision
seemed fair and looked to be the final answer to disputes of this kind.
But the highest Court went backwards and in March of 2007 overruled
certain aspects of Massa.156 In the Rinaldi case, even though the issue did
not involve bank deposits (it involved non-bank hypoteques), the Court
brought back the shared efforts doctrine and ordered the debtors to pay
1.8 pesos per dollar owed. The Rinaldi Court also recognized that there
was no injury to private property because the government was not taking
away any property but was just limiting the use of such property. The
Court in Rinaldi delivered an opinion more along the lines of U.S. juris-
prudence. Citing to U.S. Supreme Court precedent (Blaisdell),157 Argen-
tina's Supreme Court recognized that that during an emergency the
government has the power to determine the intrinsic value of its currency,
but it is up to the Court to determine whether there existed any abuse in
the application of the emergency laws.158
153. Id. T 7.
154. Id. at 2, holding. (translated by author)
155. Id.
156. CSJN, 15/3/2007, "Rinaldi, Francisco Augusto y otro c/ Guzm6n Toledo, Ronal
constante y otra s/ ejecuci6n hipotecaria," Fallos [R.320.XLII] (Arg.).
157. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
158. Id. at 234 n. 3. This Court has the power, in the case at bar, to review the legisla-
tive declarations: (a) as to the existence of emergency in which the government
had the duty to act as to the existence and extent of the 'public interest'; b) to
ascertain whether the object comes within the legitimate scope of the police
power; c) to ascertain whether the rules and standards provided, if any, are reason-
ably definite and certain; and (d) to ascertain whether the extent and effect of the
legislation are such as reasonably and properly to accomplish a legitimate object
within the police power. Id. (internal citations omitted). Id.
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IV. ARGENTINA'S PESIFICATION DECISIONS COMPARED
TO U.S. GOLD CLAUSE DECISIONS
Argentina's Constitution is based on the U.S. Constitution, so Argen-
tina's system and the United State's system include a similar separation of
the branches of government, which tends to guarantee judicial indepen-
dence.159 But Argentina's system departs radically from the U.S. model
by expressly granting the federal government broad general powers to
promote the economic prosperity of the nation and the conduct of human
development. 160 But in reviewing constitutional problems addressed by
the Supreme Courts of both countries regarding takings issues, the Courts
share many similarities.
A. BOTH COUNTRIES USED Two CURRENCIES AT THE SAME TIME
In the Gold Clause cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the unifica-
tion of the country's economy from one using gold and dollars to one of
using just dollars. For many years gold worked as a support of the U.S.
dollar. Gold grew stronger and so did its demand, thus threatening the
gold/dollar balance. President Roosevelt prohibited people to withdraw
or utilize gold as currency. Everybody that had gold was required to ex-
change it for paper currency. During that process, too many people lost
money since the dollar had devaluated against gold. The U.S. Congress
did not allow people to lose money (they got the same amount they spent
on gold back in dollars), but it also did not allow them to become better
off (Gold bonds had appreciated sixty percent with respect to the dollar
but repayment was still done based on the purchase price). In making
such a harsh decision, similar issues to the ones in Massa were litigated.
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that a gold bondholder was not enti-
tled to redeem a bond that was payable in gold coin of the standard of
value at the time of purchase for an amount in legal tender that was in
excess of the face value of the bond based upon a decrease in the weight
of U.S. gold dollars.1 61 In another decision, the Court reasoned that Con-
gress was empowered with the authority to regulate the value of money,
and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out that enumer-
ated power.162 Furthermore, the Court stated that "[c]ontracts may cre-
ate rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject-matter
which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital infir-
mity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of domi-
159. Hon. Elena Highton-Nolasco, Vice President, Supreme Court of Argentina, Trans-
national Judicial Dialogue: Strengthening Networks & Mechanisms for Judicial
Consultation & Cooperation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Judicial Ethics and the Role of Judges in a Democratic Society (Dec. 2, 2006) availa-
ble at http://www.asil.org/judicialtransnational/documents/TJD-Ethics-Highton-
070122.pdf.
160. Id. See also CONST. ARG. § 75(18) (Clausula del Progreso).
161. Perry, 294 U.S. at 330.
162. Norman, 294 U.S. at 240.
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nant constitutional power by making contracts about them. '163 The
Court uses an example in which if someone contracts for a fixed shipping
rate and then Congress prescribes different rates, the latter will control
and override those rates in contracts previously made. 164
Argentina had two alternate currencies during the 1990s, the peso and
the dollar. The dollar served as support for the peso. Thus, if we use the
reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court above, Congress would have the
power to alter the value of the currency even amongst private parties
since Congress would retain control over the subject-matter of those con-
tracts (value of money). Therefore, changing the intrinsic value of money
should not be considered as an expropriation by the government. The
pesification of the economy in Argentina would be analogous to the dol-
larization of the U.S. economy during the 1930s. In Argentina, the con-
vertibility was an artificial parity and congress had, by constitutional
delegation, the power to establish the value of such parity. The Argen-
tine Congress decided against pesification, and the executive disregarded
Congress' advice and decreed the pesification; this is where the compari-
son differs. In the United States, Congress dictated what to do and the
executive upheld and obeyed Congress's guidelines. But in Argentina,
Congress dictated what to do, and the executive overruled and did not
abide. But this by itself should not be grounds for declaring the decree
unconstitutional. "The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a rhetorical
phrase in American political and legal discourse.165 The phrase expresses
the belief that constitutional restrictions on governmental power must
give way to urgent practical needs. 166 Argentina was experiencing social
unrest and economic and political crises. Under a state of emergency, the
executive power is relaxed and must to do what it deems necessary for
the good of the country. Argentina's constitution establishes that the
government retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good or-
der of society.' 67 This same phrasing was used by the U.S. Supreme
Court: "The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presup-
poses the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worth while,-a government which retains adequate authority
to secure the peace and good order of society.' 68 Furthermore, Argen-
tina's Supreme Court rejected U.S. precedent on the ground that they
addressed the issue of power and not economic issues.169 The fact is that
the issues of pesification and El Corralito are issues of whether the gov-
163. Id. at 307-308.
164. See id.
165. Abraham Lincoln used this phrase as a response to charges that he was violating
the United States Constitution by suspending habeas corpus during the American
Civil War. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Robert H. Jackson, J.,
dissenting op.).
166. Id.
167. See CONST. ARG., Preamble.
168. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
169. See Massa, Fallos [M.2771.XLI], Argibay, J., op., T 9.
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ernment has the power to alter the intrinsic value of its currency. Thus,
some believe that the Constitution grants such power.
B. SIMILAR ISSUES, DIFFERENT RESULTS
One of the main reasons for the different results in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions compared to the Argentina's Supreme Court decisions
is Argentina's Supreme Court's unstable track record that seems to result
in contradicting decisions time and again. 170 Some commentators point
out that because Argentina uses civil law, the Court does not pay too
much attention to precedent as being mandatory authority, but merely
persuasive. 171 Another set of arguments points to the fact that the Court
is highly politicized, and thus it lacks independence from the govern-
ment.1 72 Therefore, the judges make decisions according to who is ruling
the executive in order to safeguard their jobs. 173 Moreover, the Court's
delay in ruling on these constitutionality issues backs this latter hypothe-
sis that the government pressured the Court to delay its ruling until the
country's financial picture had improved to the point that it could manage
the format and the timing of a return of dollar deposits. 174 This is not
uncommon in the history of Argentina's Supreme Court.175 One can not
help but be a little skeptical about the Court's decisions as allegations
arise. It took the Court too long to resolve an issue that required imme-
diate action by them in order to protect Argentina's citizens, and it still
seems not to have a final answer. The U.S. 1930s gold crises were much
more severe in terms of the government taking a harsher measure. But
the Supreme Court made a definite ruling in evaluating that it was for the
good of the country and stuck by it. People learned to live with it.
V. CONCLUSION
Governmental intervention during times of emergency seems to be a
very normal occurrence, as was the case in Argentina and many other
countries (United States, Russia, etc.). Governmental intervention can
be very appropriate when duly justified. A country's economy can not
survive without a strong government, but also its citizens can not survive
without a strong government to protect them. Aside from some of the
170. Becky L. Jacobs, Pesification and Economic Crisis in Argentina: the Moral Hazard




174. Argentine High Court Postpones Ruling Until February, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,
Dec. 27, 2002.
175. Decree 2196, Dec. 2, 1986, A.D.L.A. 4180. Decree 2196 of 11/28/86 declares in
state of economic emergency the national social security system established by
Laws 18037 and 18038. This law stops as of the promulgation date and until 12/31/
88 all the lawsuits, including the execution of judgments and administrative claims,
brought against the Caja Nacional de Prevision. See Caja Nacional de Prevision,
http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=22806); see also Jacobs, supra note 170.
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controversial blame that could arguably be attributed to the IMF and its
policies, it is up to Argentina to face and accept all the responsibilities of
the crisis. The problem in Argentina seems to be that neither its govern-
ment nor its Supreme Court enjoy the full trust of the Argentine people.
Both the Court and the government carry the heavy burden of a turbu-
lent past.
The pesification crisis exposed Argentina's economic and judicial
weaknesses to its maximum; Massa is a great example where we can ob-
serve both. Many Argentines lost everything they owned because of the
pesification; on the other hand many came out ahead. The poverty line
increased from thirty percent before the crisis to more that fifty percent
after the crisis, which indicates that the lower and middle classes suffered
the highest impact. Argentina was left economically devastated by the
crisis, internally and at externally. Argentina also lost worldwide credi-
bility because of the crisis, and its economy, although regaining strength,
is still suffering the consequences.
In terms of justice, Argentina's Supreme Court does not have the most
credible track record. As history shows, since the government has ex-
erted some influence on the Court's decisions, future decisions become
plagued with doubt. Argentina's Supreme Court has to establish a more
consistent rule of law, one that not only Argentines will respect but one
that the whole world could grow to respect.
In Massa, there was no majority holding (four votes is majority) with
respect to the issue of the constitutionality of the pesification. It would
be incorrect to say that the Court declared the pesification of bank depos-
its to be constitutional. What the Court did was not to declare pesifica-
tion of bank deposits unconstitutional, and that way avoided ruling on the
most important issue. The Court, without deciding the constitutionality of
the pesification decree, decided how much money the savers would get
back from the banks. Therefore, the Court pesificated the deposits in the
way it thought most appropriate. The irony is that the Court had to de-
cide on the constitutionality of the pesification; instead, it ruled that it
was not unconstitutional and then came up with its own pesification
method.
The Massa victory, as the solution to one of the biggest bank crises of
all time, was short lived. The Court's solutions in Massa were only made
possible by the time that elapsed between the facts and the Court's deci-
sion, which allowed Argentina's economy to recover to a point where
such a ruling could be afforded. Still, there was a sense that justice had
not been served. The struggle of the Court in arriving at a concrete solu-
tion is prolonging Argentina's agony in fully recovering from the effects
of the crisis. Decisions have to be made seasonably because if not, future
circumstances (or others) will decide for us.
